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COMMENTS
Can Georgia Bank on Its Garnishment Laws?*
Since the late sixties the field of creditors' remedies has undergone a
series of changes brought about by several U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
Old concepts of protection for the creditor have been changed or modified
to recognize procedural due process rights of the debtor. While it is easy
to say that there have been changes, it is becoming increasingly more
difficult to identify exactly what is required by the courts to satisfy the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Georgia prejudgment
garnishment statutes unconstitutional in North Georgia Finishing Co. v.2
Di-Chem,' the Georgia legislature responded by passing new statutes
which were apparently aimed at meeting the due process requirements
established by earlier cases.' Before this new statute could be tested, a
challenge to the old code section as applied to post-judgment garnishment
came before the Georgia Supreme Court. Coursin v. Harper presented the
question of whether post-judgment garnishment required due process protection similar to pre-judgment garnishment. The supreme court answered
in the affirmative.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that due process was required in postjudgment garnishment as well as pre-judgment cases. 5 But what proce* After this article was written, the Georgia Supreme Court decided City Finance Co. v.
Winston, No. 31483 (Oct. 19, 1976). That case held unconstitutional the 1976 amendments
to the Georgia garnishment laws, Ga. Laws, 1976, pp. 1608-29, which made provisions for
post-judgment garnishment different from those for pre-judgment garnishment. The 1976
changes were unconstitutional for the same reason the provisions considered in Coursin v.
Harper, 236 Ga. 729, 225 S.E.2d 428 (1976), were unconstitutional: There was no provision
for notice to the defendant and no judicial supervision initially. It is apparent that any
garnishment statute, to be upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court, must meet the standards
of North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975), Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974), and Carey v. Sugar, U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1208 (1976). In City Finance,
the supreme court said Coursin had said that "the 1975 amendment ... to the garnishment
laws supplied the deficiencies in the former law."
1. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
2. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 1291.
3. See Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974), where the Court approved the Louisiana
ex parte pre-judgment sequestration procedure to forestall waste or alienation of property
subject to a security interest. Louisiana required judicial supervision of the process and proof
of claim and provided for a prompt post-seizure hearing for dissolution of the writ and
damages award for wrongful use of the procedure. See also Note, 26 MERcER L. REv. 325
(1974).
4. 236 Ga. 729, 225 S.E.2d 428 (1976). The Georgia statutes in effect prior to July 1, 1975,
were applicable since the affidavit was made and summons issued on June 30, 1975. Id. at
729-30, 225 S.E.2d at 428.
5. Id. at 733, 225 S.E.2d at 430.
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dures meet due process standards? The question now facing Georgia
lawyers is whether the new Georgia Code section6 dealing with garnishment
is constitutionally sufficient.
This comment will review recent developments in due process requirements for creditors' remedies with particular emphasis on their impact on
Georgia garnishment law, and will include a meaningful background in
this field as well as present an analysis of the status of Georgia garnishment law with suggestions as to the probable direction future decisions will
take.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.7 struck the first blow against what
had been accepted procedures in the field of creditors' remedies and initiated a period in which the courts have more closely scrutinized and defined
the procedural due process rights of the debtor. In Sniadach, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that notice and a hearing were required before prejudgment garnishment of wages could be enforced. 8
In the period following its decision in Sniadach and Goldberg v. Kelly9
it was thought that the Court might be carving out a position that required
due process only when necessary items such as wages and welfare benefits
were jeopardized. However, three years after Sniadach, the Court, in
Fuentes v. Shevin,10 clarified its position on the types of property that
required notice and hearing. In Fuentes, the Court invalidated Florida and
Pennsylvania statutes that allowed "summary seizure of goods or chattels
in a person's possession under a writ of replevin."" The statutes allowed
issuance of a writ of replevin based on an ex parte application upon the
posting of a security bond."
The Court in Fuentes pointed out that even a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property was a deprivation recognized under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 In the case of a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation, due
process requires notice and a hearing at a "meaningful time."'" The Court
noted that in property deprivation cases the only meaningful time for a
hearing is at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. 5 The
6.

Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 1291.

7. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
8.

Id. at 342.
397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court held that welfare benefits were a statutory entitlement
for qualified persons and that notice and a hearing were required before state officials could
terminate benefits already being paid.
10. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
11. Id. at 69.
12. Id. at 69-70.
13. Id. at 85.

9.

14.
15.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
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Court pointed out that "no later hearing and no damage award can undo
the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural
due process has already occurred."'"
While the Court firmly stated the requirements for due process, they did
not "question the power of the state to seize goods prior to final judgment
in order to protect the security interests of creditors" after a hearing.'7 The
Court also left open the question of the nature and form of the hearings.,
Before Fuentes the definition of property had been held to include "any
significant property interest."' 9 Fuentes broadened this definition by holding that a possessory interest in chattels was such a "significant property
interest." 0 With Fuentes, the Court appeared to be forging a firm set of
rules to provide procedural due process protection to debtors, including
those who held property encumbered with an outstanding security interest.
However, two years later in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.," the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana ex parte sequestration statute that
provided for neither notice nor a hearing before judicial seizure of property
for the purpose of preserving it pending litigation over the debt secured by
the property. In Mitchell, W. T. Grant sued for the overdue balance owed
on personal property alleging a vendor's lien on the property and requesting sequestration of the goods."
In upholding the Louisiana procedure, the U. S. Supreme Court recognized that the possessor of the property and the lien-holder each had a
recognized interest in the property.22 Thus, the Court held that Louisiana's
statute authorizing judicial sequestration of such property to preserve the
property's value pending outcome of the suit on the debt had sufficient
safeguards built into it to meet due process requirements without a preseizure hearing.2 4 The Court distinguished Sniadach5 and Fuentes26 without specifically overruling either.
Mitchell apparently retreated from the proposition in Fuentes that no16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 82.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 96-97.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
20. 407 U.S. at 84.
21. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
22. Id. at 601-02.
23. Id. at 607.
24. These safeguards were: (1) the nature and amount of the claim should clearly appear
from the facts presented in a verified affidavit or petition; (2) judicial supervision of the
procedure; (3) provision for a prompt post-seizure hearing for dissolution of the writ; (4) if
the writ were dissolved, damages and attorney's fees could be awarded. Id. at 616-17.
25. The Court pointed out that in Sniadach the creditor had no prior interest in the
property attached and that the opinion in that case did not deal with the typical installment
seller situation found in Mitchell. Id. at 614.
26. The Court said that since the statutes examined in Fuentes did not provide for judicial
supervision, affidavit of facts, or a speedy post-seizure hearing, that case was sufficiently
different from the statute before the Court in Mitchell. Id. at 615-16.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

tice and hearing were required before any deprivation. It was widely
thought that the Court was de facto overruling Fuentes" and returning to
what had formerly been the recognized remedies of creditors.
At this juncture in the development of procedural due process, the Court
apparently had decided that judicial supervision was sufficient to protect
the debtor. This is important in garnishment cases since Fuentes had been
thought to have expanded due process rights of notice and hearing to
virtually all property rights, thereby negating the interpretation of
Sniadach that had restricted the holding to wage garnishment procedures. 8 Mitchell apparently distinguished garnishment, leaving the
2
Fuentes requirement of notice and hearing in garnishment cases intact.
30
In North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, the U.S. Supreme Court
attempted to establish due process guidelines for non-wage garnishment.
The challenged Georgia statutes authorized garnishment in pending actions on the affidavit of the plaintiff or his attorney based upon conclusory
allegations. There was no provision for judicial supervision, notice, or an
early hearing. The only method available for dissolution of the writ was
3
for the defendant to post a bond.
In North Georgia Finishing, the plaintiff corporation had garnished the
defendant corporation's bank account under the Georgia statute which
permitted garnishment as a pre-judgment remedy. The Court discussed
both the Sniadach/Fuentes approach and the Mitchell view and decided
that the Georgia statute failed to meet due process requirements under
either approach. In the view of Sniadach and Fuentes, the bank account
was property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant
corporation had been deprived of this property without notice and hearing
and without participation by a judicial officer. 2 Further, the Georgia statute did not have the "saving characteristics" of the Louisiana statute in
Mitchell. There was no judicial supervision or entitlement to an immediate
hearing. In addition, the affidavit called for by the statute did not require
33
statements clearly setting out the facts entitling the garnishor to relief.
North Georgia Finishing served to underscore the Court's indecision as
to what is required for due process. Fuentes had apparently held that if
the property in question was property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, then notice and a hearing were required before deprivation. Fuentes
had also expanded the definition of protected property to include a vast
spectrum of interests that included debts available for process of garnish27.

Id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 634 (Stewart, Douglas, & Marshall, J.J.,

dissenting).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

407 U.S. at 72, n. 5.
416 U.S. at 614-15.
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 607.
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ment.34 Then Mitchell had apparently distinguished garnishment from
security interests in personal property, requiring something less than notice and hearing in property cases and not laying down new standards for
garnishment cases.
The decision in North Georgia Finishing did not clarify matters. First,
the Court laid out the Fuentes rule, apparently supporting the requirements of notice and hearing in pre-judgment garnishment cases. Then, in
the next sentence, the Court said that Fuentes required notice and hearing
or "other safeguards against mistaken repossession." The decision then
pointed out that the Georgia statute did not meet the Mitchell standards:
apparently the "other safeguards against mistaken repossession." 3'
IE.

COURSIN V. HARPER

37
the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
In Coursin v. Harper,
procedure for post-judgment garnishment which had existed in Georgia
prior to July 1, 1975, had failed to provide the alleged judgment debtor
with procedural due process. 38 Plaintiffs attorney had made affidavit before a superior court deputy clerk on June 30, 1975.11 Bond with security
was given by the attorney at that time, and the clerk issued a writ of
attachment which required the sheriff to serve a summons of garnishment.
The summons was then issued by the clerk designating the United States
of America as garnishee. After the summons had been served, the garnishee mailed notice of the garnishment to the defendant. On August 6,
1975, the defendant or judgment debtor filed pleadings in the action. In
the interim, the garnishment was answered by the garnishee and funds
owed to the alleged debtor were paid into the court registry.40 The trial
court rendered a judgment that dismissed the plaintiffs action and held
that the making of an affidavit before the clerk and the issuance of a
summons on the basis of that affidavit was an unconstitutional procedure.
The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed." The
court observed that the case was controlled by the statutes that were in
effect prior to July 1, 1975.11
In reaching the decision in Coursin, the court stated that North Georgia

34.

407 U.S. at 89-90.

35. 419 U.S. at 606.
36. Id. at 607.
37. 236 Ga. 729, 225 S.E.2d 428 (1976). The decision stated that the proceedings were
garnishment in attachment. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 8-5 (1973) while North Georgia Finishingwas
concerned with the garnishment procedures of GA. CODE ANN. tit. 46 (1974).
38. 236 Ga. at 733, 225 S.E.2d at 430.
39. Id. at 729-730, 225 S.E.2d at 428. There had been a previous judgment against the
defendant in a divorce action.
40. Id. at 729-30, 225 S.E.2d at 428-29.
41. Id. at 731, 225 S.E.2d at 429.
42. Id.
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Finishing had held the "old garnishment procedure, both pre-judgment
and post-judgment, unconstitutional on procedural due process
grounds." 43 Further, the court noted that the majority opinion in North
Georgia Finishinghad distinguished between the Georgia statutes and the
statutory scheme which was upheld in Mitchell by stating: "The Georgia
garnishment statute has none of the saving characteristics of the Louisiana
statute.""
The court in Coursinstated that there was "little difference between prejudgment and post-judgment garnishment proceedings insofar as procedural due process of law is concerned. 4 5 Both a judgment debtor and a
non-judgment debtor must be given due process, and there are certain
requirements which must be met in order to avoid wrongful deprivation of
property whether or not the creditor has obtained a judgment." The court
additionally supported its conclusion by giving several reasons why a judgment debtor must be afforded due process to avoid illegal deprivations of
property. 7
I[.

GEORGIA GARNISHMENT PROCEDURES

Under the statutes dealt with in Coursin, creditors were entitled to process of garnishment when a suit was pending or where judgment had been
obtained." The plaintiff, his agent or his attorney made an affidavit before
an authorized officer or the clerk of the court in which the garnishment or
case was filed. The affidavit stated the amount claimed due in any pending
action or on any judgment already rendered. The affidavit would also state
that there was reason to believe that all or part of such sum would be lost
unless garnishment was forthcoming. Under the applicable statute, bond
was given in an amount twice the sum claimed to be due. If the amount
stated as being due was not recovered in the suit or that claimed on a
judgment was not due, such bond was payable to the defendant for his
costs and damages. 9 When the affidavit was made by an agent or an
attorney, it could be sworn to according to the best of that individual's
43. Id. The Georgia court did express some disagreement with the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in North Georgia Finishing. Id. at 732, 225 S.E.2d at 430.
44. Id. at 732, 225 S.E.2d at 429, quoting from 419 U.S. at 607. See note 25, supra.
45. Id. at 732-33, 225 S.E.2d at 430.
46. Id. at 733, 225 S.E.2d at 430. The requirements the court set out were judicial supervision over a proposed temporary deprivation along with notice and opportunity for an early
hearing after the deprivation.
47. Id. "Some judgements are procured many years in advance of their attempted enforcement; there are instances of partial payment on judgments; there are installment judgments,
especially in the alimony field; there are judgments that were procured illegally; and there
are judgments which have expired and are unenforceable."
48. GA. CODE ANN. §46-101 (1974). As to a situation where suit was pending, the Court in
North Georgia Finishing had, as previously discussed, held this to be unconstitutional.
49. GA. CODE ANN. §46-102 (1974).
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knowledge and belief." Under the former statutes the defendant could
obtain dissolution of garnishment upon filing a bond with good security in
the court where the judgment was obtained or where suit was pending. The
bond was payable to the plaintiff for any judgment rendered on the gar5
nishment.
As the court in Coursin noted, the new procedures which had become
2
effective on July 1, 1975, had made several changes in the prior statutes.
The affidavit must now be made before a judicial officer who has supervision over the garnishment process. Further, the affidavit must state that
there is apprehension of loss of all or part of the claimed amount, and it
must be made clearly setting out the facts under which such loss and
issuance of garnishment is claimed. 5 An attorney or agent of the plaintiff
who makes the affidavit swears to its contents according to his personal
knowledge .5 The official issuing summons of garnishment shall issue a
copy directly to the defendant. 5 As to dissolution, which may still be
obtained by the filing of a bond with good security, the defendant may,
within twenty days of service, petition the court for an immediate hearing." At such hearing plaintiff must show probable cause for issuance of
7
the garnishment.
IV.

THE COURSIN DECISION AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

In its decision in Coursin, the Georgia Supreme Court faced the question
of whether due process was required in post-judgment garnishment cases,
and, if so, what would satisfy such requirements. After answering the
question affirmatively, the court attempted to define the necessary standards.5 8 The court apparently concluded that the criteria set forth in
Mitchell was a minimum acceptable standard.50 This conclusion was apparently the result of the court's analysis of the decision of the U. S.
Supreme Court in North Georgia Finishing. However, a close reading of
North Georgia Finishing indicates that the decision was based on the fact
that the Georgia statutes did not meet the standards set forth in either
Fuentes or Mitchell and did not purport to establish what due process
standards were actually required in garnishment cases. 0
The old statutes construed in Coursin failed to meet the due process
50.
51.

GA. CODE ANN. §46-103 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §46-401 (1974).

52.

236 Ga. at 731, 225 S.E.2d at 429.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.

58.
59.

236 Ga. at 733, 225 S.E.2d at 430.

60.

419 U.S. at 605-08.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§46-102 (Supp. 1975).
§46-103 (Supp. 1975).
§46-105.1 (Supp. 1975).
§46-401(b) (Supp. 1975).
§46-401(c) (Supp. 1975).

Id.
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requirements of Sniadach and Fuentes. In a post-judgment garnishment
situation the Coursin court's reliance on North Georgia Finishingwas correct as to the constitutionality of the statute in that "the probability of
irreparable injury . . . is sufficiently great so that some procedures are
necessary to guard against the risk of initial error." 6' There was the probability of initial error in that the old statutes did not have the notice or
hearing"2 of Fuentes and Sniadach, nor did the statutes "minimize the risk
6' 3
of error of a wrongful interim possession.
V.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW GARNISHMENT PROCEDURES

The question which now must be answered is whether the new garnishment provisions will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Obviously, there is a failure to meet the requirements of
Fuentes before seizure in either a pre-judgment or post-judgment situation
since there is no provision for a pre-seizure hearing.
As to satisfaction of Mitchell criteria, the statutes do provide for judicial
supervision, and the affidavit must be based on more than mere conclusory
allegations." The statutes also provide the defendant in a garnishment
proceeding with the right to petition for an immediate hearing for dissolution of the garnishment. 5 Yet, while the garnishment statute does appear
to satisfy the criteria of Mitchell, the Court added in Mitchell that "this
is not a case where the property sequestered by the court is exclusively the
property of the defendant debtor."'6 Mitchell involved property with a
"heavily encnmbered" title. 7 The Court was concerned with and gave
several reasons for the need to protect the interests of the creditor. 6 Finally, the Court in Mitchell distinguished the factual situation presented
there from that presented in Sniadach by stating: "The suing creditor...
had no prior interest in the property." 6 Referring to Sniadach, the Court
said that "the creditor's claim could not rest on the danger of destruction
of wages, [which were] the property seized, since their availability to
satisfy the debt remained within the power of the debtor who could simply
leave his job."7
61. Id. at 608.
62. Id. at 606.
63. 416 U.S. at 618.
64. GA. CODE: ANN. §46-102 (Supp. 1975).
65. GA. CODE ANN. §46-401(b) (Supp. 1975).
66. 416 U.S. at 604.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 608-10. The Court was particularly concerned with the erosion of the property
as security for the seller's interest and the risk that with continued possession the buyer could
destroy or conceal.
69. Id. at 614.
70. Id.
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VI.

CAREY V. SUGAR

While the Court in Mitchell carefully distinguished the property interest
involved, the recent case of Carey v. Sugar7' has caused further confusion
in any attempt to limit the Mitchell standards to the type of secured
property interest involved in Mitchell. In Carey, the constitutionality of
the pre-judgment attachment statutes of New York were challenged.72 The
property for which attachment was sought was a debt owed by one corporation to another.73 Attachment in New York under the applicable statutes
could be granted in favor of a plaintiff by a judge prior to any judgment. '
Such a procedure, however, would have to be supported by an affidavit
showing a cause of action and demonstrating that one of the applicable
grounds existed.75 In addition, the judge could require the plaintiff to post
a bond for any legal costs or damages the defendant would incur if he
prevailed in the law suit.7" The defendant could gain dissolution by posting
a bond equal to the value of the property attached77 or by moving to
vacate."
The defendants in Carey did not attempt dissolution under either
method. Instead they attacked the constitutionality of the statutes,
seeking an injunction and order vacating the attachment of the debt.79 The
three-judge court found for the defendant holding that the hearing on a
motion to vacate was an inadequate safeguard.8 The court reasoned that
such a hearing would not compel "the plaintiff to litigate the question of
the likelihood that it would ultimately prevail on the merits.",,
In the per-curiam decision the U.S. Supreme Court remanded to the
lower court with instructions to "abstain from a decision of the federal
constitutional issues until the parties . . . obtain a construction of New
York law from the New York state courts. 8 12 The Court, referring to the
dissolution hearing, cited both Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing in
holding that "an inquiry consistent with constitutional standards is by
no means automatically precluded." Such standards apparently would
71.
72.

__
U.S. __
96 S.Ct. 1208 (1976).
Id. at __, 96 S.Ct. at 1208.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.

79.

__

Civ.
Civ.
Civ.
Civ.
Civ.

PRAc.
PRic.
PRAc.
PRAC.
PRAc.

§6211 (McKinney 1963).
§6212(a) (McKinney 1963).
§6212(b) (McKinney 1963).
§6222 (McKinney 1963).
§6223 (McKinney 1963).

U.S. at __, 96 S.Ct. at 1210.

80. The lower court felt that it was inadequate in that such a hearing would be concerned
only with the necessity of attachment as security for the plaintiff. Id. at __, 96 S.Ct. at
1210.
81.

Id. at..,

82.
83.

Id. at.
Id. at

96 S.Ct. at 1210.

.,
,

96 S.Ct. at 1211.
96 S.Ct. at 1210.
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be "adequate preliminary inquiry into the merits of a plaintiff's underlying
claim.""
The Court's opinion in Carey related only to the nature of the hearing
after attachment.15 The procedures before the order of attachment was
issued, which were similar to the safeguards of Mitchell, were not questioned.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In view of the Carey decision, an area of many inconsistencies has become even more confusing. The decision raises more questions than it
answers. The primary question is whether Carey is an expansion of the
Mitchell procedures beyond the type of encumbered personal property
found in Mitchell. The result of such an expansion would be that Sniadach
and Fuentes could be relegated to oblivion. 8
If Carey may rightly be viewed as expanding Mitchell, the Court apparently has forgotten the careful distinctions it made in Mitchell regarding
garnishment. Garnishment statutes such as Georgia's, with only the safeguards of Mitchell, will be held to be constitutional. The Coursin court's
reliance on the reference to Mitchell in North Georgia Finishing would
then be proven correct and Georgia's new garnishment statute would be
held to be constitutional."
Carey appears to be a preview of the direction the U.S. Supreme Court
will take in garnishment cases. However, the Court still has two alternatives in garnishment cases. The first is to follow the Sniadach-Fuentespreseizure notice and hearing requirement; the other is to expand Mitchell as
the Court appeared ready to do in Carey. Only a clear, unambiguous
decision in a future case will remove the uncertainty that permeates garnishment laws in Georgia and elsewhere.
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84. Id.
85. The Court pointed out that the three-judge court had noted that the plaintiff had no
"special property interest in the property attached" as the plaintiff in Mitchell had. The
96 S.Ct. at 1210, n.2.
decision did not discuss this any further. Id. at -,
86. In Fuentes the Court had stated that it is "a prior hearing that is the only truly
effective safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of property." 407 U.S. at 83.
87. See notes 66, 67, 69, 70, supra.
88. In support of this the Court did state in North Georgia Finishing: "We are no more
inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of property
in applying the Due Process Clause." 419 U.S. at 608. See also 407 U.S. at 89-90.
89. This would be true provided that the dissolution hearing provided by GA. CODE ANN.
§46-401 (Supp. 1975) is of the nature stated in Carey.

